Archive for foreign animal disease

6 Months. 113 Outbreaks. Farmers vs. Riot Police. France’s Lumpy Skin Disease Crisis Is Writing North America’s Playbook in Real Time

Military helicopters dropping vaccines. Farmers in riot gear standoffs with police. A disease that jumped 300 kilometers in weeks despite aggressive containment. France’s lumpy skin disease crisis is writing the playbook for foreign animal disease preparedness in real time—and the rest of us get to learn before it’s our turn.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Six months after France confirmed its first case, lumpy skin disease has exploded to 113 outbreaks and 3,300 cattle culled—with military helicopters deploying vaccines and riot police confronting farmers who’ve blockaded roads rather than surrender herds to mandatory slaughter. This disease has never reached North America, but France’s crisis is exposing failures that matter everywhere: veterinary surge capacity that couldn’t scale, cold chain logistics that collapsed under pressure, and a culling-first policy that shattered the farmer trust essential for disease surveillance. When reporting sick cattle means losing everything, producers stop reporting—and containment becomes impossible. EFSA research shows that vaccination outperforms culling even when vaccines aren’t perfect, yet France chose aggressive depopulation anyway. The economic precedent is sobering: India lost $2.44 billion to endemic LSD in two years; Canada spent 22 years rebuilding export markets after BSE. For North American producers—especially those with genetics programs dependent on trade—the window to establish biosecurity protocols, quarantine procedures, and veterinary relationships is now, while there’s still time to prepare rather than improvise.

Lumpy Skin Disease Crisis

You know, there are moments when agricultural policy stops being abstract and becomes deeply, painfully human. December 12, 2025, was one of those moments.

Police in riot gear faced off against hundreds of farmers who had barricaded a small farm in France’s Ariège region with chopped trees, hay bales, and sheer desperation. Tear gas filled the evening air. The standoff wasn’t about wages or trade policy—it was about cattle marked for slaughter in the name of disease control.

What made the scene even more gut-wrenching? The farm belonged to two brothers. One had agreed to the government’s culling order. The other refused. That division within a single family tells you something about the impossible choices this disease is forcing on people across the French countryside.

And for those of us watching from North America, Australia, or anywhere else still free of lumpy skin disease, France’s unfolding crisis offers something genuinely valuable: time to learn before the same pressures arrive at our gates.

QUICK REFERENCE: Know the Threat Landscape

 Lumpy Skin DiseaseH5N1 (Avian Influenza)Bluetongue (BTV-3)
Primary VectorBiting insects (stable flies, midges, mosquitoes)Direct contact, aerosol, contaminated equipmentCulicoides biting midges
Species AffectedCattle, buffaloDairy cattle, poultry, wild birdsCattle, sheep, goats, deer
Current SpreadFrance: 113 outbreaks (Dec 2025)US: ~1,790 herds/18 states (Dec 2025)Netherlands, Belgium, France, UK, Germany
Incubation Period4-14 days (up to 28 days)2-5 days (in cattle)5-20 days
Milk Production ImpactSignificant (18%+ drop in affected animals)Severe: ~73% drop at peak; ~2,000 lbs cumulative loss/cow over 60 days~2 lbs/cow/day for 9-10 weeks
Human Health RiskNoneYes (rare but serious)None
Vaccine AvailableYes (live attenuated)LimitedYes (serotype-specific)

Sources: WOAH, EFSA, USDA APHIS, CDC, Hoard’s Dairyman, Frontiers in Veterinary Science

How a Single Case Became 113 Outbreaks in Six Months

Here’s where the timeline gets troubling.

LSD first appeared in Western Europe when Italy confirmed a case in Sardinia on June 21, 2025—the European Commission’s Animal Disease Information System flagged it almost immediately. Six days later, France confirmed its first positive case on a dairy operation near Chambéry in the Alpine department of Savoie, as Dairy Global reported at the time.

French authorities moved fast, I’ll give them that. Vaccination campaigns launched by mid-July. Protection zones extending 50 kilometers went up around affected areas. The response looked impressive on paper:

  • Over 220,000 cattle vaccinated within two months, according to Reuters
  • Mandatory movement restrictions across affected regions
  • Military logistics deployed by December, including transport aircraft and army medical personnel

And yet by mid-December, Reuters was reporting 113 confirmed outbreaks with approximately 3,300 cattle culled. The disease had spread from two eastern departments to span regions across the country—including southwestern areas near the Spanish border, more than 300 kilometers from where it started.

The disease jumped containment lines that should have held. What happened? The answer isn’t any single failure. It’s a cascade of interconnected problems that overwhelmed even a well-resourced system.

CLINICAL SIGNS: What LSD Looks Like in Your Herd

Early Warning Signs (First 1-2 Days):

  • High fever exceeding 40.5°C (105°F), sometimes reaching 41°C (106°F)
  • Watery discharge from the eyes and nose
  • Enlarged superficial lymph nodes (subscapular, prefemoral—easily palpable)
  • Decreased milk production in lactating cows
  • Depression and loss of appetite

Characteristic Signs (Days 7-14 Post-Infection, can extend to 21 days):

  • Firm, raised skin nodules 2-5 cm in diameter
  • Nodules appear on the head, neck, limbs, udder, genitalia, and perineum
  • Nodules involve skin, subcutaneous tissue, and sometimes underlying muscle
  • Nasal discharge becomes thicker (mucopurulent)
  • Excessive salivation
  • Limb swelling and brisket edema

In Calves:

  • More severe clinical presentation than adults
  • Higher mortality risk, especially in calves under 3 months
  • Generalized weakness and diarrhea

Report any suspected cases immediately to your state/provincial veterinarian

Sources: WOAH, Merck Veterinary Manual, Animal Health Australia

The Infrastructure Gap Nobody Talks About

One of the most important lessons coming out of France—and this applies to all of us—involves the difference between having resources on paper and actually deploying them under pressure.

France has world-class veterinary infrastructure. The ANSES laboratory network ranks among Europe’s best. The animal health surveillance system is sophisticated and well-funded. What France lacked, and what most countries lack, is surge capacity.

Vaccine supply became the first bottleneck. France had to access the European stockpile after the first case appeared rather than drawing on pre-positioned reserves. That created delays—days in some areas, weeks in others.

The veterinary workforce was the second constraint. If you’re already struggling to get your herd vet out for a routine visit, imagine what happens when your whole region needs emergency vaccinations. Dairy Global reported in 2023 that of Germany’s roughly 22,000 practicing veterinarians, only about 3,500 still work with agricultural livestock. France faces similar ratios. When mass vaccination required hundreds of additional personnel, the civilian system simply couldn’t scale.

Cold chain logistics emerged as the third challenge. Distributing temperature-sensitive live attenuated vaccines to remote rural areas proved harder than planned. By December, Reuters confirmed the French government had brought in military transport aircraft specifically because civilian logistics couldn’t keep pace.

What’s interesting here is that none of these constraints were invisible beforehand. Agricultural ministries across Europe have documented veterinary workforce shortages for years. But there’s often a significant gap between recognizing a structural problem and having a solution ready when a crisis hits.

The practical takeaway for those of us elsewhere? Even countries with excellent veterinary services face significant delays when novel diseases appear. Operations with established biosecurity protocols and regular veterinary relationships will respond faster than those depending entirely on government systems.

HOW LSD SPREADS: Understanding Transmission

Primary Route: Biting Insects (Mechanical Vectors)

Unlike many viral diseases, LSD spreads mainly through biting insects that carry virus particles on their mouthparts—not through the air or direct animal contact.

INFECTED ANIMAL → BITING INSECT FEEDS → INSECT MOVES → HEALTHY ANIMAL INFECTED

  • Virus present in skin nodules and blood
  • Virus retained on mouthparts for 6-10 days
  • Virus deposited into the skin during the next blood meal
  • Infection is established in a new host

Known Vectors:

  • Stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans) — Primary mechanical vector
  • Mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti, Culex species) — Can retain virus 6-10 days
  • Biting midges (Culicoides species) — Field evidence of involvement

Why This Matters for Biosecurity:

  • Vector control (fly management, standing water elimination) directly reduces transmission risk
  • Disease can spread without animal-to-animal contact
  • Infected insects can travel significant distances, especially with the wind
  • Peak transmission occurs during warm, wet conditions when vector populations surge

Minor Transmission Routes:

  • Direct contact with infected animals (considered inefficient)
  • Contaminated equipment or fomites (limited evidence)
  • Semen from infected bulls (documented but uncommon)

Sources: WOAH, PMC research (Paslaru et al. 2022), EFSA

What This Means for Your Genetics Program

For operations with significant genetics investments—AI programs, embryo transfer work, show herds, or A2A2 breeding programs—LSD introduces complications that go well beyond direct animal health.

Here’s the reality: The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has confirmed that importation of live cattle or water buffalo from LSD-infected countries is prohibited outright. Semen and embryos collected more than 60 days prior to an outbreak may be eligible, but only following case-by-case evaluation. That’s not “business as usual”—that’s bureaucratic uncertainty at exactly the wrong moment.

The international standards are even more restrictive. WOAH’s Terrestrial Code requires donor animals to have been resident for six months in an LSD-free country or zone before embryo collection can begin. For semen, PCR testing on blood samples is mandatory at commencement, conclusion, and at least every 28 days during collection.

What does this mean practically? If LSD ever reaches North America, operations with high-value genetics face immediate complications: AI studs would need to implement enhanced testing protocols, export markets would close pending disease-free certification, and movement restrictions could strand valuable animals in the wrong locations. Premium genetics programs—particularly those reliant on international trade—face heightened exposure to these disruptions.

Australia’s response to Italy’s outbreak offers a preview. Within days, the Australian Department of Agriculture removed Italy from its LSD-free country list and suspended imports of bovine fluids and tissues, as Dairy Global reported. That’s how fast market access disappears.

What the Balkans Actually Did (It’s Not What You’ve Heard)

French officials have pointed to southeastern Europe’s successful LSD eradication from 2015-2018 as justification for aggressive culling. But looking closer at what Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia actually did reveals a more nuanced story—and honestly, it’s one that should inform how we think about disease response.

When LSD spread across the Balkans beginning in 2015, affected nations achieved eradication within about three years. That success is often attributed primarily to stamping-out policies. The evidence, though, tells a different story.

Mass vaccination was the primary tool, not culling.

According to the WOAH Regional Representation for Europe, Bulgaria became the first country in the region to achieve 100% cattle vaccination coverage—by July 15, 2016. By 2017-2018, regional vaccination coverage exceeded 70% across all affected countries, with EFSA reporting over 2.5 million animals vaccinated annually to maintain that level of protection.

And here’s the key finding from the European Food Safety Authority’s 2016 analysis: “Vaccination has a greater impact in reducing LSDV spread than any culling policy, even when low vaccination effectiveness is considered.”

That’s significant. The modeling showed vaccination mattered more than culling even when the vaccines didn’t work perfectly. Greece—often cited as the culling success story—actually implemented vaccination as its primary strategy, while selectively using targeted depopulation.

Now, this doesn’t mean France’s current approach is wrong. Every outbreak involves different circumstances, trade considerations, and policy factors that aren’t always visible from the outside. But the Balkan experience does demonstrate that vaccination-centered strategies work against LSD when implemented at scale and sustained over time.

When Farmer Trust Breaks Down, Surveillance Dies

This might be the most important lesson from France, and it doesn’t show up in epidemiological models. It’s about psychology as much as biology.

By December 2025, the relationship between French farmers and authorities had deteriorated badly:

  • Farmers in southwestern France organized highway blockades with over 60 tractors
  • Some producers physically prevented vaccination teams from accessing properties
  • Reports emerged of farmers declining to report suspected cases
  • By mid-afternoon on December 19, Le Monde reported the Interior Ministry counted 93 protest actions nationwide involving nearly 4,000 people and 900 tractors

The economic pressure driving this isn’t hard to understand. French agricultural unions have documented that many farmers were already facing severe financial strain before LSD appeared. When total herd depopulation becomes the standard response to a positive test, farmers face an impossible choice: report disease and lose everything, or stay silent and hope.

It’s worth recalling what the FAO advised during the Balkan response back in 2017, as quoted by Dairy Global: “Stamping out—the proactive culling of all animals on an infected farm—should be used as a last resort because stamping out can have a drastic impact on farmers’ livelihoods, particularly those of smallholders.”

What makes this dynamic so dangerous for disease control is that effective surveillance depends entirely on voluntary reporting. The moment farmers believe that calling a veterinarian will lead to the loss of their entire operation, the information flow stops. Cases go unreported. Disease spreads invisibly. And containment becomes exponentially harder.

Here’s the trade-off France is learning—painfully: Vaccination protects herds but may delay disease-free certification. Aggressive culling accelerates certification but destroys farmer trust and surveillance cooperation. And the second trade-off may be worse.

The Endemic Scenario: What’s Really at Stake

In France’s substantial dairy sector, an important question is being discussed in industry circles: What happens if eradication fails?

Countries where LSD has become endemic offer sobering guidance.

India’s experience since 2019 illustrates the potential scale. A March 2025 study in Frontiers in Veterinary Science used stochastic modeling to estimate economic losses from LSD at approximately $2.44 billion over 2022-2023, with Rajasthan alone experiencing annual losses of around $314 million.

Thailand’s ongoing management since 2021 shows the persistent costs of endemic disease. Research published in Frontiers in Veterinary Science this past January found per-farm financial impacts ranging from $349 on farms that avoided outbreaks—covering vaccination and prevention costs—to $727 on farms that experienced active infections, including treatment and production losses. And those costs continue indefinitely.

For France specifically, endemic status would likely mean:

  • Loss of disease-free certification affecting cattle export markets
  • Restrictions on the genetics trade, including semen and embryo shipments
  • Ongoing vaccination expenses across the national herd
  • Competitive disadvantage relative to disease-free neighbors

Now, some argue that endemic management is economically preferable to aggressive eradication—that the costs of culling and farmer resistance outweigh the costs of living with the disease. There’s a case there for countries where LSD is already widespread. But for North American producers? We still have a disease-free status. And when BSE hit Canada in 2003, it took nine years to regain access to beef exports to South Korea and Peru, and a full 22 years before Australia reopened to Canadian beef in July 2025, according to CFIA. That certification represents real value that’s easy to take for granted until it’s gone.

Dairy Cattle Disease 2025: LSD in Context

France’s LSD crisis isn’t occurring in isolation—it’s part of a broader pattern of emerging disease pressures reshaping risk calculations for livestock producers worldwide. Understanding this context helps explain why France’s response capacity was already stretched thin when LSD arrived.

H5N1 in US dairy cattle emerged in March 2024, and by December 2025, CIDRAP reported cases in approximately 1,790 herds across 18 states. What’s striking is the production impact—peer-reviewed research in Frontiers in Veterinary Science found that affected cows experienced approximately a 73% decline in milk production at peak infection, with cumulative losses averaging around 2,000 pounds per cow over 60 days.

Bluetongue BTV-3 re-emerged in the Netherlands in September 2023 and spread to Belgium, France, the UK, and Germany. Infected cattle experience roughly 2 pounds of lost production per cow per day for 9 to 10 weeks.

Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease affected over 4,500 French farms by summer 2024—creating overlapping response demands before LSD even appeared.

But here’s what makes LSD different: Unlike H5N1 (which poses human health concerns driving rapid government response) or bluetongue (which European producers have managed through multiple outbreaks), LSD is genuinely novel to Western Europe. There’s no institutional memory, no existing vaccination infrastructure, no producer experience recognizing early signs. France is writing the playbook in real time.

DiseaseMilk Drop %DurationLoss per CowHuman RiskCurrent Spread
Lumpy Skin Disease18%VariableSignificantNone113 farms (FR)
H5N1 Avian Flu73% ⚠️60 days~2,000 lbs ⚠️Yes1,790 herds (US)
Bluetongue BTV-38-10%9-10 weeks~140-200 lbsNoneMultiple EU

What Prepared Producers Are Doing Right Now

Against this backdrop, forward-thinking operations are taking practical steps—not out of panic, but out of recognition that preparation before a crisis beats improvisation during one.

Biosecurity fundamentals that actually matter:

  • Written quarantine protocols. New animals are isolated for a minimum of 21 days before joining the main herd, with dedicated equipment and documented testing requirements. Having this written and posted matters when you’re making decisions at 3 a.m. during a crisis. You know how it goes—everyone assumes someone else wrote it down.
  • Controlled access management. Single farm entrance, where feasible; visitor logs; foot baths at barn entries; and defined biosecure zones. A producer in Wisconsin’s dairy corridor mentioned that making biosecurity part of the morning routine—the same crew member checks gates and foot baths before first milking every day—made consistency almost automatic.
  • Vector control. Given LSD’s insect-borne transmission, fly management is particularly important. Eliminating standing water, maintaining manure management, and using appropriate insecticides during peak vector season all reduce transmission risk.
  • Established veterinary relationships. Farms with trusted, ongoing relationships with their veterinarians respond more quickly when concerns arise. Your herd vet should know your operation well enough to spot when something seems unusual.
  • Insurance review. Here’s something worth checking: most standard livestock mortality policies don’t explicitly cover losses from foreign animal diseases like LSD. Specialized policies may include provisions for border closure and disease-related depopulation, but coverage varies significantly. Worth a conversation with your agent before you need to file a claim.
  • Neighbor communication networks. Informal information sharing between nearby operations often identifies emerging concerns faster than official channels. A quick text from down the road beats a government bulletin by weeks.

THIS WEEK ACTION CHECKLIST

☐ Download biosecurity assessment checklist (CFIA: inspection.canada.ca or FARM Program: nationaldairyfarm.com)

☐ Walk your perimeter—identify fence gaps, uncontrolled access points

☐ Write a one-page quarantine protocol: duration, location, equipment, testing, end criteria

☐ Review fly control program—identify standing water sources and elimination opportunities

☐ Create a laminated vet contact card: herd vet, state/provincial vet, your GPS coordinates

☐ Call your insurance agent—ask specifically about foreign animal disease coverage

☐ Have an informal conversation with 1-2 neighboring operations about recent herd health observations

Estimated time: 4-5 hours spread across the week

Estimated cost: $350-500 (foot bath supplies, signage, veterinary consultation)

ActionTimeCostPriority
Download biosecurity assessment checklist30 min$0CRITICAL ⚠️
Walk farm perimeter – identify gaps45 min$0High
Write one-page quarantine protocol1 hour$0CRITICAL ⚠️
Review fly control & standing water1 hour$200-300High
Create laminated vet contact card30 min$50CRITICAL ⚠️
Call insurance re: FAD coverage45 min$0Medium
Talk with neighboring operations30 min$0Medium
TOTALS4.5-5 hours$250-3503 Critical + 4 High/Med

For Canadian Producers Specifically

Canada’s proximity to the evolving US H5N1 situation makes foreign animal disease preparedness particularly relevant right now. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency offers comprehensive biosecurity planning resources at inspection.canada.ca, including province-specific guidance and self-assessment tools.

One thing worth noting: provincial veterinary contacts and disease reporting protocols differ by region. Ontario requires immediate reporting of serious animal health risks—within 18 hours—through OMAFRA’s Agricultural Information Contact Centre at 1-877-424-1300, while western provinces have different reporting structures and timelines. Having your specific provincial contacts documented before you need them eliminates uncertainty when timing matters.

As of December 2025, CFIA has implemented proactive import measures following Europe’s LSD outbreaks, including restrictions on live cattle, certain dairy products, and germplasm from affected countries. The agency’s stated priority: “Preventing the introduction of LSD into Canada is critical because the disease can spread quickly and significantly impact cattle production and trade.”

What I’ve noticed talking with producers across different provinces: the operations that feel most confident about their preparedness aren’t necessarily the largest or most technologically sophisticated. They’re the ones where someone took time to work through the “what if” scenarios before circumstances made that planning urgent.

The Insight That Ties Everything Together

Looking at France’s crisis—the surveillance challenges, the economic pressure, the farmer frustration, the infrastructure gaps—one pattern emerges that underlies everything else:

The operations that survive aren’t the ones that improvise best. They’re the ones who decided their protocols, triggers, and response plans before the crisis arrived.

France improvised. The government moved from one approach to another as circumstances evolved. Farmers found themselves caught between compliance and survival. Veterinarians ended up in impossible positions. When nobody has pre-committed frameworks, confusion fills the gap. And confusion is lethal to disease control.

The farms that will navigate the next decade successfully won’t necessarily be the most optimized or the most efficient in normal times. They’ll be the ones with biosecurity protocols already documented, veterinary relationships already established, neighbor networks already communicating, and financial reserves already set aside.

That’s not paranoia. That’s pattern recognition from what’s actually happening—right now—in France, Thailand, India, and increasingly across the global dairy sector.

Key Takeaways

On what France teaches:

  • Surge capacity matters more than baseline infrastructure
  • Biosecurity protocols are most valuable when they exist before they’re needed
  • Financial reserves matter enormously in a world of recurring disease pressures

On disease response dynamics:

  • Vaccination-centered strategies have demonstrated effectiveness against LSD at scale
  • Farmer trust is essential infrastructure—systems that undermine trust undermine themselves
  • The gap between “response started” and “disease controlled” can stretch for months

On taking action this week:

  • Complete a biosecurity assessment using available checklists
  • Establish written quarantine protocols and post them where they’ll be followed
  • Decide your operational tripwires while your head is clear

The Bottom Line

France is still fighting. Whether eradication remains achievable or France must adapt to endemic management will become clearer in the coming months.

But for those of us elsewhere, France has already provided the lesson that matters most: the time to prepare is before disease arrives, before trust collapses, before you’re making existential decisions at 3 a.m. with no playbook.

The producers who act on that lesson—who spend a few hours this week on biosecurity, who document their protocols, who build their networks—will be the ones still standing when the next challenge arrives.

And in this era of expanding disease pressures, the next wave is always coming.

For biosecurity planning resources, Canadian producers can access CFIA’s farm assessment tools at inspection.canada.ca. US producers can find guidance through the FARM Program at nationaldairyfarm.com and through state extension services. We’ll continue following France’s LSD situation and its implications for global dairy operations.

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Screwworm at 70 Miles: Your $400K Prevention or Permanent Cost Decision

What’s your plan when a flesh-eating parasite hits US dairy for the first time since 1966?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The September 21st confirmation of New World screwworm, just 70 miles from Texas, represents more than just another biosecurity alert—it’s a watershed moment that could fundamentally reshape American dairy economics. With beef-on-dairy programs now generating significant revenue streams for many operations and Mexico’s surveillance protocols showing documented gaps, producers face an unprecedented decision between substantial upfront investment in prevention or potentially permanent endemic management costs. Historical emergency responses demonstrate significant cost premiums for rushed implementation, while countries managing endemic screwworm report annual expenses that transform production economics entirely. What makes this particularly challenging for dairy operations is the FDA prohibition on ivermectin use in lactating cows—our most effective treatment option—combined with daily procedures that create wounds, providing ideal opportunities for infection. The convergence of reduced federal workforce capacity, complex modern cattle movement patterns, and year-round operational requirements creates vulnerabilities the industry hasn’t faced since the original eradication six decades ago. Smart producers are recognizing that the choice isn’t whether to act, but whether to invest now with preparation time and supply availability, or react later under crisis conditions with limited options.

dairy biosecurity protocols

The confirmation of New World screwworm in Nuevo León, Mexico, on September 21st serves as a stark reminder of an emerging biosecurity threat—a flesh-eating parasite now just 70 miles from major Texas dairy operations. This is a challenge the industry hasn’t faced in nearly six decades.

What strikes me about the financial reality facing producers is how similar it feels to other major capital decisions we make. Examining comparable disease prevention programs, such as those developed for bovine TB, reveals substantial investments—the kind typically associated with significant infrastructure upgrades. That’s no small commitment for any operation. However, what’s particularly noteworthy is research from regions managing endemic screwworm, which suggests ongoing annual costs that essentially become a permanent line item in your budget. It’s the difference between a one-time capital investment and… well, a forever production tax.

This builds on what we’ve seen with other biosecurity challenges, but with unique complications. Federal officials have been discussing Mexico’s surveillance approaches this week, and while everyone’s doing their best with available resources, coordination challenges are real. Meanwhile—and this is fascinating from an economic perspective—beef-on-dairy programs have transformed from a sideline to a significant revenue stream for many operations. Add the workforce transitions happening at federal agencies, and you’ve got a convergence of factors that makes this genuinely different from previous challenges.

The $325 Question: Why Every Day of Delay Costs You Money

Understanding the Biology and Its Implications

I’ll share something that surprised me when reviewing the APHIS technical materials. The reproductive capacity of this parasite is… remarkable, in the worst possible way.

According to disease response protocols that APHIS developed, female screwworm flies deposit 200 to 400 eggs in any open wound. Now, when I say “any wound,” I mean the routine management activities we all do—dehorning sites, ear tag punctures, even those minor scrapes that happen during handling. The larvae emerge within 24 hours and consume living tissue. Without intervention, mortality can occur within seven to ten days.

What’s particularly relevant for dairy operations—and veterinary specialists have been emphasizing this point—is our management intensity. Here’s something worth considering: beef operations might handle animals twice a year, but we create potential infection sites daily through routine procedures. Our stocking density, especially in modern freestall barns, creates transmission dynamics that differ significantly from those in extensive grazing systems.

This aligns with our understanding of disease spread in confined environments. Those crossbred calves from beef-on-dairy programs? They’re moving through multiple facilities—dairy to calf ranch, backgrounder, feedlot. Each movement represents what epidemiologists call a “mixing event,” creating opportunities for the transmission of disease.

The Castration Crisis No One’s Talking About

And here’s a regulatory complexity worth noting: ivermectin, our most effective treatment option for screwworms, remains prohibited for use in lactating dairy cows under current FDA guidelines due to the risk of drug residues in milk. This restriction fundamentally alters our response options compared to beef operations, where its use is permitted.

Dr. Andy Schwartz, our Texas State Veterinarian, framed it well in recent discussions: “The proximity to major dairy operations in the Rio Grande Valley creates legitimate concerns. These aren’t hypothetical risks anymore.”

A significant concern is the current capacity situation. During the successful eradication campaigns of the 1960s, sterile fly production reached hundreds of millions weekly. Program reports indicate the Panama facility now operates with more limited capacity. Mexico’s facility upgrades won’t come online until next summer. Why does this matter? We’re essentially defending against this threat with limited tools while managing more complex cattle movement patterns than existed 60 years ago.

The Cross-Border Dynamics

The situation with Mexico is… nuanced, and I want to be fair here because they’re dealing with significant challenges.

Federal agriculture officials have highlighted that surveillance protocols involve checking fly traps every few days rather than daily. Now, Mexico’s perspective is that this frequency was mutually determined, and they’re balancing massive geographic areas with limited resources. However, here’s the biological reality: with a seven- to ten-day life cycle, less frequent monitoring could allow multiple generations to occur between detection points.

The cattle movement situation adds another layer of complexity. Industry assessments suggest substantial undocumented cattle movement from Central America into Mexico—significantly more than documented imports. These animals lack health documentation and tracking. It’s creating what you might call significant biosecurity gaps.

Border-area producers have expressed concerns that resonate with many of us. The general sentiment is: “We’re implementing every protocol possible, but without consistent standards across the border, it feels incomplete.” That’s not criticism—it’s recognition of the interconnected nature of modern agriculture.

What’s economically interesting is that Mexico’s meat sector is facing substantial losses due to current restrictions. You’d expect that would drive stricter enforcement, but political and practical realities are complex. The infected animal in Nuevo León apparently originated from southern Mexico, highlighting the challenges associated with these movements.

Economic Considerations for Different Operations

Comparing notes across the country, the economic scenarios vary significantly by operation type and location.

For operations considering immediate implementation, the investment profile looks like this: infrastructure for isolation facilities (similar to building a commodity shed), equipment upgrades, and protocol development. Based on what we’ve learned from TB eradication and other disease programs, you’re looking at costs comparable to significant capital improvements. Add operational changes over the first quarter—such as extra labor, veterinary oversight, and supplies—and it becomes substantial.

However, what’s interesting from a risk management perspective is that If you wait for a confirmed border crossing? Historical emergency responses indicate significant cost premiums for rushed implementation, as well as production disruptions. Remember during the 2016 Florida screwworm incident? Producers were unable to source basic supplies at any price once panic buying began.

The third scenario—wait and see—presents different risks. Countries managing endemic screwworm report permanent annual costs that fundamentally change production economics. Some operations simply can’t absorb that burden long-term.

Why is this significant for dairy specifically? These beef-on-dairy programs have become economically important. Crossbred calves are bringing prices we couldn’t have imagined five years ago. Industry experience suggests these programs have become economically significant for many operations. Under quarantine? That revenue stream stops immediately.

Quick Decision Framework

Here’s how I’m thinking about the options:

Option 1: Implement Now

  • Investment comparable to a major equipment purchase
  • Maintain operational continuity when a threat materializes
  • Competitive advantage during a crisis

Option 2: Wait for Confirmation

  • Significant cost premiums due to emergency implementation
  • Risk of supply shortages
  • Potential quarantine disruption

Option 3: Hope It Passes

  • Risk of permanent endemic management costs
  • Possible operation shutdown
  • Market-driven exit

How Different Regions Are Approaching This

What’s fascinating is watching how different regions are adapting based on their unique circumstances.

Upper Midwest operations with seasonal calving patterns have natural advantages—their wound-creating procedures often align with colder months when fly activity is minimal. Wisconsin operations are restructuring their management calendars around this principle.

Southwest dairies face different challenges. They’re dealing with year-round fly pressure and proximity to the threat zone, but many have scale advantages. These larger operations can spread biosecurity investments across more production units, significantly altering the per-cow economics.

Pennsylvania grazing operations are exploring interesting approaches. They’re minimizing wound-creating procedures and looking at genetic selection for naturally polled animals. It’s a long-term strategy, but it illustrates how different production systems create different vulnerability profiles.

Technology adoption patterns are revealing, too. Operations that were skeptical about automation are suddenly seeing it differently. The thinking goes: if automated health monitoring helps catch problems earlier, it’s not just about labor anymore—it’s about survival.

Practical Lessons from Early Implementation

Producers who are already implementing protocols have shared valuable insights that are worth sharing.

The human resource challenge keeps coming up. Training staff to identify early symptoms requires significant time investment. But here’s the catch—in today’s labor market, retention is challenging. Industry feedback indicates significant challenges with training retention. Now operations are building redundancy into their training programs.

Wound management strategies are evolving in interesting ways. Several operations have completely restructured their annual calendar. All dehorning happens in January-February now. They’re using caustic paste despite the 16-week healing time because it reduces the risk of long-term exposure. Every management decision gets evaluated through a wound-risk lens.

Supply chain preparedness is critical. The 2016 Florida experience taught us that essential supplies disappear within 48 hours of crisis confirmation. Smart operators are building inventory now—not hoarding, but ensuring adequate reserves of critical items.

What’s encouraging is the emergence of collaborative approaches. Some producer groups in affected regions are exploring collaborative approaches—coordinating bulk purchases and sharing specialized equipment. They’re reporting meaningful cost reductions that make individual preparation more feasible. There’s wisdom in that collective approach.

Broader Industry Implications

If establishment occurs—and given the proximity and surveillance challenges, we need to consider this possibility—the implications extend far beyond individual operations.

Countries managing endemic screwworm deal with permanent surveillance requirements, ongoing treatment protocols, production impacts from chronic stress, and restricted market access. Processing and distribution patterns shift away from affected regions. These aren’t temporary adjustments; they become permanent features of the production landscape.

The downstream effects touch everyone. School nutrition programs may face supply chain challenges or budget pressures due to rising prices. Rural communities that rely on dairy as an economic anchor could experience an accelerated decline. The genetic diversity maintained by mid-sized operations—that’s at risk too.

What’s particularly concerning from a market structure perspective is how this could accelerate consolidation. When you add significant biosecurity costs to already tight margins, the economics become challenging for operations below certain scale thresholds.

Resources and Next Steps

For those ready to take action, here are key resources:

Start with USDA APHIS Veterinary Services at 1-866-536-7593 for current technical guidance. Your state veterinarian, who can be found at usaha.org/saho, can provide region-specific recommendations. The Texas Animal Health Commission at 1-800-550-8242 has developed particularly relevant materials given their proximity to current threats.

Local Extension programs are developing training materials. I’d especially recommend connecting with programs that dealt with the 2016 Florida situation—they have practical experience worth learning from.

Document everything. While current programs may not cover all prevention costs, detailed records could prove valuable for future assistance programs or insurance considerations. Think of it as an investment in operational history that might have value later.

Looking Forward

After three decades in this industry, I’ve seen us navigate numerous challenges—price volatility that tested everyone’s resilience, droughts that forced impossible decisions s, and disease outbreaks that seemed insurmountable at the time. This situation presents unique challenges, but it’s not insurmountable.

The operations that successfully navigate this won’t necessarily be the largest or most technologically advanced. They’ll be those who recognized the threat early, made thoughtful decisions based on their specific circumstances, and acted decisively even with incomplete information.

Our industry will likely emerge differently—possibly more concentrated, certainly with higher operational costs, and definitely requiring more sophisticated management approaches. But we’ll also develop better biosecurity practices and potentially more sustainable systems through improved management. Whether these changes prove beneficial long-term… well, that depends on how we collectively respond now.

For individual operations, the fundamental question remains: Can your business model absorb either significant prevention investment or ongoing management costs? Every operation has unique circumstances, and there’s no universal answer. Some may find traditional approaches adequate, while others require creative solutions. The key is honest assessment and timely action.

As veteran producers in South Texas have observed, we’ve faced hurricanes, droughts, and market crashes. Biological challenges are different—they operate on their own timeline, regardless of our preparedness. They just need an opportunity. And intensive dairy operations, by nature, provide opportunities.

The parasite is 70 miles from Texas. Winter’s approaching, though weather patterns suggest it might not provide the protection we’d hope for. Decisions made now—individually and collectively—will shape our industry’s trajectory for years to come.

This isn’t about fear. It’s about preparation, adaptation, and the resilience that’s always defined American dairy farming. Whatever path forward you choose for your operation, make it based on careful consideration of your specific circumstances. Because in this situation, the cost of indecision might exceed the cost of action.

KEY TAKEAWAYS:

  • Immediate implementation saves 20-30% versus emergency response costs based on historical biosecurity crises, with collaborative producer groups achieving even better economics through bulk purchasing and shared resources—the difference between planned investment and panic-driven spending
  • Regional advantages matter: Upper Midwest operations with seasonal calving can align wound-creating procedures with cold months when fly pressure is minimal, while Southwest dairies need scale advantages to spread costs across more production units—adapt protocols to your geography
  • Beef-on-dairy revenue streams face immediate risk under quarantine scenarios, with crossbred calf movements creating transmission pathways that didn’t exist during the 1960s eradication—protect what’s become a critical income source for many operations
  • Document everything starting today: detailed biosecurity expense records, position operations for potential future assistance programs or insurance claims, even though current programs don’t cover prevention—think of it as operational insurance you control
  • The 2016 Florida incident proved supplies disappear within 48 hours once a crisis hits—smart operators are building adequate reserves now, focusing on wound treatment supplies, fly control products, and isolation infrastructure before availability becomes an issue

Complete references and supporting documentation are available upon request by contacting the editorial team at editor@thebullvine.com.

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