Archive for dairy farm viability

Walmart’s Second Milk Plant Is Open. For Mid-Size Dairies, the Clock Is Ticking.

18 months after Walmart opened its first milk plant, Dean Foods filed for bankruptcy. Plant #2 is now open. Mid-size dairies—what’s your move?

Executive Summary: Walmart’s second milk plant opened in Valdosta, Georgia, on December 2, 2025—and history offers a sharp warning. Dean Foods filed for bankruptcy just 18 months after Walmart launched its first plant. For mid-size dairies, this isn’t background noise; it’s a decision point. Three paths forward exist: scale to 1,500+ cows with processor commitments in writing, pivot to specialty markets with buyer agreements secured upfront, or exit strategically while cattle and land values hold. Your timeline isn’t set by milk prices alone—your lender’s risk appetite and your region’s Class I dependency matter just as much. Southeast producers face tighter constraints than Upper Midwest operations with cheese plant alternatives. The dairies that navigated the Fort Wayne transition successfully weren’t the biggest; they were the ones asking hard questions while everyone else was still waiting for news.

While the ribbon-cutting in Valdosta was all smiles and corporate handshakes, the silence in Georgia’s milking parlors was deafening. Walmart just cut another slice out of the middleman’s pie by opening its second owned-and-operated milk plant and sourcing directly from regional farms, and producers are rightfully asking: “Am I next?”

When Walmart opened its $350 million milk processing facility in Valdosta, Georgia, on December 2, 2025, it didn’t generate the national headlines you might expect for a project of this scale. But for those of us watching the dairy supply chain closely, it’s a development worth understanding.

This is Walmart’s second owned-and-operated dairy facility, following Fort Wayne, Indiana, back in 2018. A third plant in Robinson, Texas, is set to open in 2026. According to Walmart’s corporate announcement, the Valdosta plant will serve more than 650 stores and Sam’s Clubs across the Southeast under the Great Value and Member’s Mark labels.

What does this mean for producers? Well, that depends on your situation, your region, and your position in the supply chain. Let me walk through what we know and what it might suggest.

Dr. Mark Stephenson—who spent years as Director of Dairy Policy Analysis at the University of Wisconsin-Madison before his recent retirement—offers a useful perspective here. “We’re watching the supply chain reorganize in real time,” he’s noted. “When retailers capture processing margin internally, it changes the economics for everyone else in the chain.”

That’s neither inherently good nor bad—it’s a structural shift that creates both challenges and opportunities depending on where you sit.

I reached out to both Walmart and Dairy Farmers of America for their perspectives on this piece. Walmart pointed us to their public statements about the Valdosta facility. DFA didn’t respond to our request.

What We Learned from the Fort Wayne Transition

The pattern that emerged after Walmart’s Fort Wayne plant came online in 2018 offers a useful case study—both in terms of what went sideways for some producers and what went right for others.

Dean Foods, then America’s largest fluid milk processor, lost substantial Walmart volume when Fort Wayne opened. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in November 2019—about 18 months later—in the Southern District of Texas under Case No. 19-36313. Now, it’s worth remembering that Dean was already facing significant headwinds: declining fluid milk consumption, aging infrastructure, and substantial debt. The Walmart contract loss accelerated an existing trajectory rather than creating it from scratch.

What happened next reshaped the cooperative landscape considerably. Dairy Farmers of America acquired 44 Dean Foods processing facilities for approximately $433 million in May 2020, according to DOJ filings related to the transaction. Industry analyses at the time suggested this significantly expanded DFA’s processing footprint—on the order of one-third more capacity, though the exact figure depends on how you measure it.

I’ve spoken with producers in Indiana and Ohio who experienced this transition firsthand, and their perspectives vary widely. One producer—who asked to remain anonymous because he still ships through a DFA-affiliated handler—described the compressed timeline: “We had maybe six months of warning before everything changed. Guys who moved fast found alternatives. Guys who waited got whatever terms were left.”

But I also spoke with Mike (not his real name), who runs about 900 cows in northeast Indiana and came through the transition in good shape. His approach was instructive. When Dean started showing financial stress in early 2019, he didn’t wait for official announcements. He spent three months building relationships with regional processors—before he needed them.

“By the time Dean went under, I had two backup options lined up,” he told me. “The difference wasn’t herd size or butterfat performance or who had the best fresh cow protocols. It was just who started making phone calls earlier.”

That’s a lesson worth holding onto: early information gathering creates options that may not exist later.

Regional Market Structures: Why Location Matters So Much

Here’s something that deserves more attention in industry discussions: the same consolidation trend creates very different situations depending on where you’re located.

The USDA Agricultural Marketing Service tracks Class I utilization—the percentage of milk going to fluid beverage use versus manufacturing—by Federal Order. The numbers tell an interesting story about regional market structure:

  • Florida Federal Order: Class I utilization runs around 82%, meaning the vast majority of milk goes to fluid products
  • Southeast Federal Order: Generally in the mid-to-high 70s for Class I utilization
  • Upper Midwest Federal Order: Roughly 8-10% Class I utilization—almost all the milk goes to cheese, butter, and powder
Geography isn’t destiny, but it sure shapes your options. Florida and Southeast producers face 75-82% Class I dependency with 2-3 regional processors. Lose one buyer and you’re scrambling. Upper Midwest operations live in a different world—9% Class I utilization, dozens of cheese plants competing for milk within trucking distance. Same consolidation trend, completely different exposure.

Think about what this means practically. A Wisconsin producer in the I-29 corridor has remarkable market flexibility. Dozens of cheese plants, butter manufacturers, and powder processors compete for milk within a reasonable trucking distance. If one buyer changes terms, alternatives exist. You might take a hit on hauling costs or accept different component premiums, but you’ve got options.

A Georgia producer faces a fundamentally different situation. According to UGA Extension’s most recent data, Georgia currently has on the order of 75-80 dairy farms, averaging roughly 1,000-1,050 cows each. Georgia Farm Bureau reports those farms produced about 227 million gallons of milk in 2024. And before Valdosta opened, Georgia Milk Producers confirms the state had exactly two commercial milk processing plants—in Atlanta and Lawrenceville.

“We’re working with a more concentrated market,” one South Georgia producer explained to me last month. “When your milk has to go to fluid processing, and there are limited plants in the region, the negotiating dynamics are just different than what our friends in Wisconsin experience.”

This isn’t about one region being better than another—it’s about understanding how market structure shapes your strategic options. A trucking constraint of roughly 300 miles for fluid milk (where economics start to get challenging) means Southeast producers can’t easily access Midwest cheese markets as an alternative outlet.

Understanding the Cooperative Landscape

This topic generates strong opinions, and I want to approach it thoughtfully. DFA’s position in the market is complex, and reasonable people can disagree about what it means.

When DFA acquired those 44 Dean Foods plants in 2020, it created something unusual: an organization that simultaneously represents milk producers as a cooperative and purchases milk from producers as a processor. The USDA Packers and Stockyards Division has examined this dual structure.

This arrangement has faced legal scrutiny over the years. A federal lawsuit filed by Food Lion and the Maryland-Virginia Milk Producers Cooperative in May 2020 (Middle District of North Carolina, Case No. 1:20-cv-00442) raised questions about market practices. DFA has also paid or agreed to pay settlements in various pricing cases: $140 million in a Southeast settlement back in 2013, $50 million in a Northeast settlement in 2015, and most recently about $34.4 million (combined with Select Milk Producers) in July 2025, according to Reuters coverage of that agreement.

So how should producers think about this? Here’s my read on the tradeoffs:

The case for cooperative membership is genuine:

  • Guaranteed milk pickup provides real security, especially in volatile markets
  • An extensive processing network offers market access across regions
  • Collective bargaining can deliver input cost advantages
  • For producers without strong independent processor relationships, membership provides a reliable home for their milk

The considerations are also worth weighing:

  • Various fees and deductions typically reduce effective milk prices—I’ve reviewed producer milk checks showing $1.50-4.00/cwt below Federal Order minimums, though this varies considerably by situation
  • Equity contributions may be locked for extended periods with limited liquidity
  • Governance structures naturally give larger members more influence
  • The processing division’s interests don’t always align perfectly with member pricing

The right answer depends entirely on your specific situation. For some operations, cooperative membership is clearly the best choice. For others with strong independent relationships, different arrangements make more sense. The key is evaluating your actual options rather than making assumptions either way.

AspectMembership UpsideMembership Considerations
Milk pickupGuaranteed pickup, logistical securityHauling and service fees reduce net price
Market accessExtensive processing networkLimited ability to pursue independent buyers
Milk priceCollective bargaining benefits$1.50–4.00/cwt below Federal Order minimums
EquityOwnership stake in systemEquity locked, limited short‑term liquidity
GovernanceVoice through member structureLarger members hold more influence
Processor alignmentShared interest in volumeProcessing margin may not align with member pricing

The Economics of a Mid-Size Operation

Let me walk through some representative numbers, because I find concrete figures help clarify the discussion.

A 600-cow dairy—fairly typical for a mid-size operation in the Southeast or Mid-Atlantic—produces roughly 150,000 hundredweight of milk annually at 25,000 pounds per cow. That’s achievable with good genetics, solid fresh-cow management, and attention to transition-period health.

At $23/cwt milk prices, a 600-cow operation nets just $287,500 annually—8% margin. But here’s the gut punch: every $1/cwt price drop erases $150,000 in annual income. Drop to $19/cwt for 12-18 months and working capital starts bleeding out. The math doesn’t care how good your management is.

Current economics, as best we can estimate:

  • All-milk prices have been running in the $22-24/cwt range, depending on region and components, with USDA’s December 2024 figure coming in around $23.30/cwt, according to Brownfield Ag News
  • Gross revenue at $23/cwt: roughly $3.45 million
  • Many university and FINBIN-type benchmarks suggest total costs for mid-size commercial dairies commonly fall in the high-teens to low-$20s per cwt, depending on feed costs, labor markets, and debt structure
  • Annual margin: perhaps $300,000-450,000 in favorable conditions

It’s worth noting that feed costs remain a significant variable right now. Corn and soybean meal prices have moderated from their 2022 peaks, but purchased feed still represents 40-50% of total costs for most operations. And labor—particularly finding reliable, skilled help for milking and fresh cow protocols—continues to challenge operations across most regions. These factors can swing your actual cost of production by $1-2/cwt in either direction.

That margin covers debt service, family living expenses, capital reserves, equipment replacement, and taxes. It works—but it doesn’t leave much buffer for extended downturns, as many of us have experienced firsthand.

The sensitivity is worth understanding: every $1/cwt price decline reduces this operation’s annual income by $150,000. That’s $12,500 monthly. For a 600-cow barn at these benchmarks, at $19/cwt milk, margins get tight. At $18/cwt sustained over 12-18 months, working capital generally starts to deplete.

Here’s what keeps 600-cow operators up at night: a 3,000-cow operation makes $6.33/cwt more on the same milk check—purely from spreading fixed costs. You can have perfect transition cow protocols and 4.2% butterfat, and still get crushed by economies of scale. The $4-6/cwt structural gap isn’t about management—it’s math

Now, here’s some important context: larger operations often achieve meaningfully lower production costs meaningfully. Highly efficient herds in the 2,500-cow-and-up range can, in some documented cases, drive total costs into the mid-teens per cwt—say $14.50-16.00. That advantage comes from spreading fixed costs, volume purchasing power, dedicated transition facilities, and automation investments that require scale to justify.

This isn’t a criticism of mid-size management—many mid-size operations are exceptionally well-run. It’s simply the mathematics of fixed cost allocation. Understanding this dynamic helps inform strategic thinking.

Dimension600‑Cow Mid-Size Herd2,500‑Cow+ Large Herds
Annual milk per cow~25,000 lbsSimilar or slightly higher
Total cost per cwtHigh‑teens to low‑$20s$14.50–16.00 per cwt
Fixed cost per cowHigher per cowLower per cow via scale
Purchasing powerStandard feed and input pricingVolume discounts, stronger vendor leverage
Automation investmentLimited by capitalMore justified: robots, rotary parlors, tech
Margin resilienceTight margins, less downturn bufferMore buffer to ride price dips

The Credit Dimension

Here’s an aspect of industry economics that deserves more discussion: how agricultural lenders respond to sector-wide changes.

A Farm Credit loan officer shared his perspective with me recently (off the record, as is typical for these conversations): “We’re not predicting which farms will succeed. But we are required to manage portfolio risk. When we see structural shifts in an industry, our credit committees ask harder questions about renewals and terms.”

This matters because agricultural lenders operate under regulatory requirements—Farm Credit Administration examination standards and Basel III provisions—that mandate risk management responses to changing sector conditions.

The practical implications:

  • When industry consolidation becomes visible, lenders flag portfolios for review
  • Credit line renewals may face additional documentation requirements
  • Covenant thresholds (typically 45-50% debt-to-asset ratios) get enforced more carefully
  • Operations near covenant limits may face restructuring conversations

Dr. David Kohl—Professor Emeritus of Agricultural Finance at Virginia Tech, who’s consulted with farm lenders for decades—makes an important observation: producers sometimes don’t realize their decision timeline is partly defined by their lender’s risk tolerance, not just their own cash flow.

This isn’t about lenders being difficult—it’s about understanding how institutional constraints shape available options. Knowing this in advance lets you plan accordingly.

Three Strategic Directions Worth Considering

Based on current conditions and conversations with producers who’ve navigated similar transitions, three general pathways emerge. Each has different requirements and realistic odds of success.

Pathway 1: Scaling to 1,500-2,500+ Cows

What this typically requires:

  • Capital investment of $3.5-7.5 million for facilities, animals, and working capital
  • Processor commitment (in writing) before lenders will typically approve expansion financing
  • Current debt-to-asset ratio below 50%—many mid-size operations run higher
  • Access to replacement heifers in a constrained market

Regarding heifers: USDA data shows the national replacement heifer inventory has declined about 18% from 2018 levels, to around 3.92 million head. Premium springers at California and Minnesota auction barns have been bringing $3,500-4,000 per head, while USDA’s mid-2025 national average is around $3,010. This creates a real constraint on expansion timelines.

There’s another factor that doesn’t get enough attention: regulatory and permitting requirements. Depending on your state and county, expanding from 600 to 2,000 cows may trigger new CAFO permitting thresholds, nutrient management plan requirements, and neighbor notification processes. In some regions—particularly parts of the Upper Midwest and Northeast—these timelines can add 12-18 months to an expansion project. I’ve seen producers budget the capital and line up the heifers, only to spend a year and a half working through environmental review. Factor this into your planning if you’re seriously considering this path.

Realistic assessment: This pathway generally works best for operations with existing scale infrastructure, strong lender relationships, and confirmed processor partnerships. From what I’m seeing, success probability runs maybe 30-40% for operations currently in the 500-800 cow range, based on capital access constraints and market conditions.

Pathway 2: Specialty Market Transition

Options worth evaluating:

  • Organic certification: 36-month transition absorbing higher input costs before receiving organic premiums. Current organic prices are $26-28/cwt, according to USDA data, but buyer capacity is limited in many regions.
  • A2 milk: Requires 5-7 years of genetic transition through breeding and culling. Buyer infrastructure is still developing, particularly outside major metro areas.
  • Grass-fed/regenerative: 2-3 year infrastructure development for rotational grazing. Works better in some climates than others—those July temperatures in South Georgia make intensive grazing pretty challenging compared to, say, Vermont or Wisconsin.

I spoke with a producer in Pennsylvania—she asked me not to use her name—who completed an organic transition in 2021 after three years of planning. “The transition period was brutal financially,” she told me. “But I had my buyer commitment from Organic Valley before I started, and that made all the difference. Neighbors who converted without a commitment lined up… some of them waited eight, nine months for a market. You can’t cash flow that.”

Realistic assessment: Specialty markets can transform mid-size economics when accessible. The key is securing buyer commitment before incurring transition costs. With a confirmed buyer in place, the success probability runs perhaps 50-65%. Without pre-transition commitment, it’s considerably lower.

Pathway 3: Strategic Exit

This option deserves serious consideration rather than dismissal. For some families, it’s the path that best serves long-term financial security.

What orderly exit typically preserves:

  • Cattle values at current market prices (quality milking cows around $2,000/head per recent USDA livestock reports)
  • Land values before any consolidation-related softening
  • Equipment values through private sale versus auction liquidation

As an illustrative example—and I want to be clear, these numbers are scenario-based rather than universal—a 600-cow operation with 800 acres in a reasonably strong land market might preserve something like $5.5-6.0 million in net equity with a carefully planned 12-18-month exit after debt payoff.

What pressured liquidation often costs:

  • Cattle at distress prices: typically 75-80% of normal market value
  • Land under time pressure: often 80-85% of fair value
  • Equipment at auction with other distressed sellers: sometimes 45-55% of book value
  • Potential recovery in this scenario: perhaps $3.5-4.0 million
DimensionOrderly 12–18‑Month ExitForced / Distress Liquidation
Cattle pricesAround current market ($2,000/head)75–80% of normal value
Land saleNear full fair market value80–85% of value under pressure
Equipment valueBetter via private sale45–55% of book at auction
Net equity example$5.5–6.0M preserved$3.5–4.0M recovered
Decision timingProactive, with planning runwayReactive, after cash and credit crunch

The difference—potentially $1.5-2.5 million in preserved family wealth—is substantial. Your specific numbers will vary based on region, debt load, and market timing, but the principle holds.

A Wisconsin producer I know—he’s given me permission to share this—made the exit decision in 2022 with 650 cows and came out with enough to pay off all debt, set up his son in a different agricultural enterprise, and retire comfortably. “Hardest decision I ever made,” he told me. “But waiting another three years would have cost us at least a million dollars. The numbers don’t lie.”

Dr. Kohl has worked with families on both sides of this decision. His observation: “The ones who made proactive decisions came out in far better financial position than those who waited until circumstances forced their hand. The hardest part is accepting that exiting strategically isn’t giving up—it’s making the best decision with available information.”

PathwayCore RequirementsKey AdvantagesMajor Risks / Constraints
Scale to 1,500–2,500+$3.5–7.5M capital, written processor commitmentLower cost per cwt, stronger plant leverageHeifer shortage, permitting delays, lender appetite
Specialty marketsBuyer agreement before transition, multi‑year planningPremium prices (organic, A2, grass‑fed)Limited buyer capacity, tough transition cash flow
Strategic exit12–18‑month planned wind‑down, asset valuation workPreserves $1.5–2.5M more equityEmotional difficulty, timing decisions

Looking Toward 2030

Industry projections suggest continued structural evolution, though the pace and extent remain uncertain. USDA Economic Research Service data and academic analyses from places like Wisconsin and Cornell point toward some likely trends:

  • Continued farm count decline: If current closure and consolidation rates continue, several credible analyses suggest U.S. dairy farm numbers could fall into the mid-teens of thousands by 2030—perhaps 15,000-18,000 operations, compared to higher numbers today
  • Increasing herd concentration: Rabobank analysis shows roughly 65% of the national dairy herd already lives on 1,000+ cow operations. That share could reach perhaps three-quarters of cows by decade’s end if trends continue
  • Processing evolution: Continued shifts in processing ownership and structure, with remaining capacity increasingly concentrated

Regional variation matters considerably here. The Southeast and Mid-Atlantic, with their reliance on Class I markets, may see faster adjustment than the Upper Midwest, with its diverse cheese and manufacturing base.

This isn’t necessarily negative—the remaining operations will likely be financially strong and highly capable. But the structure is evolving, and mid-size operations occupy a challenging position in that evolution.

The Value of Early Information

What I keep coming back to is timing. The producers who successfully navigated the Fort Wayne transition were generally the ones who started asking questions before the answers became obvious to everyone.

Here are conversations worth having in the next month or two:

With your lender:

  • What’s our current debt-to-asset position relative to your covenant thresholds?
  • How would an expansion proposal be received in the current environment?
  • What scenarios would trigger concern about our operating line?

With your processor or cooperative:

  • How do you see your capacity and operations evolving through 2027-2028?
  • Are there volume commitments or contract structures worth discussing?
  • How is retail processing expansion affecting your planning?

With trusted advisors:

  • What are realistic current valuations for our assets?
  • What’s the tax-optimized approach for different strategic directions?
  • What are we not considering that we should?

The goal isn’t rushed decisions—it’s gathering information while options remain open.

FactorEarly Movers (Prepared)Late Movers (Waited)
TimelineBackup options lined up ~6 months aheadWaited for official announcements
Processor relationshipsProactively built with regional plantsScrambled after Dean collapse
Contract termsNegotiated better hauling and price termsAccepted remaining, less favorable deals
Stress levelMore control, planned changesHigh stress, limited leverage
OutcomeGenerally maintained stable marketsHigher risk of poor terms or stranded milk

The Bottom Line

What I see in the current environment is a transition, not a crisis. Those are different things. Transitions allow preparation time for those who use it.

The market reality:

  • Retail vertical integration is changing how processing margin flows through the supply chain
  • Regional market structures create meaningfully different situations for different producers
  • Cooperative membership involves tradeoffs worth evaluating for your specific situation

What this suggests for planning:

  • Understand where you sit on the cost curve and what that implies for your operation
  • Know your credit position and how your lender likely views sector conditions
  • Think through which strategic direction genuinely fits your operation, capital position, and family goals

On timing:

  • Information gathered now creates options later
  • Decision windows narrow gradually but persistently
  • Strategic choices made proactively typically preserve more value than reactive ones

On risk management:

  • Whatever pathway you’re considering, don’t overlook the tools available through USDA’s Dairy Margin Coverage program and Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy (LGM-Dairy). They won’t solve structural challenges, but they can provide a floor during the transition period while you’re executing your strategic plan. Your local FSA office or a crop insurance agent familiar with dairy can walk you through the current coverage options and premium costs.

The dairy industry has navigated significant transitions before and will do so again. Operations that approach current conditions with clear information, realistic assessment, and thoughtful timing will be well-positioned—regardless of which path they choose.

The least favorable outcome isn’t choosing Path 1, 2, or 3. It’s deferring the evaluation until circumstances make the choice for you.

For additional resources on dairy operation analysis and planning, contact your state extension service. The University of Wisconsin’s Dairy Marketing and Risk Management Program at dairymarkets.org offers valuable tools for price risk analysis, and the USDA’s Dairy Margin Coverage information is available at fsa.usda.gov

Key Takeaways:

  • 18 months—that’s the precedent: Dean Foods filed bankruptcy 18 months after Walmart’s first plant opened. Plant #2 launched on December 2, 2025.
  • Three paths, three price tags: Scaling requires $3.5-7.5M and processor commitments in writing. Specialty markets need buyer agreements before you transition. Strategic exit preserves $1.5-2.5M more equity than forced liquidation.
  • Your region shapes your risk: Southeast Class I markets have 2-3 processor options. Upper Midwest cheese country has dozens. Same trend, completely different exposure.
  • Lenders may move before you do: At 45-50% debt-to-asset ratios, credit committees tighten terms regardless of milk prices. Your timeline isn’t just about cash flow.
  • Early movers had options; late movers got leftovers: The producers who navigated Fort Wayne had backup relationships six months before the headlines hit. By then, the best deals were gone.

Complete references and supporting documentation are available upon request by contacting the editorial team at editor@thebullvine.com.

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The Brutal Math: 1,420 American Dairy Farms Gone, Canadian Farmers Get 2.3% Raise – Why?

Quota costs CA$2.4M in Canada. But American farmers pay the ultimate price: their farms.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Canadian dairy farmers plan five years ahead, while American producers pray to survive five months—that gap widened on October 30, when Canada announced a 2.3% price increase as U.S. prices crashed by 11.44%. Canada’s supply management system guarantees profitability but demands CA$2.4-5.8 million in entry fees, offering just 8 new-farmer positions annually per province, while 88% of farms transfer within families. America’s “free” market eliminated 1,420 farms in 2024, aided by cooperatives like DFA, which now own processing plants and profit from the same low prices that destroy their members. Both systems hemorrhage taxpayer money—Canada openly through CA$444 annual household premiums, America secretly via $2.7 billion in failing subsidies. The brutal math: by 2044, America will have fewer than 10,000 dairy farms while Canada maintains stability for an increasingly exclusive club. Solutions exist that combine Canadian predictability with American accessibility, but require farmers to stop defending broken systems and start wielding their political power like Quebec dairy did—they didn’t ask nicely; they demanded protection and got it.

Dairy Policy Analysis

You know, when the Canadian Dairy Commission announced its 2.3255% farmgate milk price increase for February 2026 last Wednesday, I couldn’t help but think about the conversations I’ve been having with producers on both sides of the border. Here’s what’s interesting—American farmers had just watched their milk prices drop 11.44% year-over-year, based on August USDA data. But this isn’t just another price comparison story, not really.

What I’ve found after digging into both systems these past few weeks is… well, it challenges a lot of assumptions we tend to make. Canadian farmers enjoy remarkable stability through supply management, that’s absolutely true. But there’s something they don’t talk about much at Holstein Canada meetings or the Royal Winter Fair—the generational entry barriers that are quietly threatening their long-term sustainability.

Meanwhile, American producers keep telling me about the “freedom” of open markets. Yet we’re watching 1,420 farms close each year, according to the latest USDA census data. At this rate—and the math here is pretty sobering—we’re looking at fewer than 10,000 U.S. dairy operations by 2044. That’s fewer farms than Canada has today, if you can believe that.

“We keep being told markets will sort it out. But after losing 400 farms in our state last year, I’m starting to wonder if the market’s solution is just to sort us out of business.” — Wisconsin dairy farmer reflecting on the 2024 closures

Part I: The Canadian System—Stability at What Cost?

How Supply Management Works: Business Planning vs. Price Taking

Canadian Farmers Plan 5-7 Years Ahead. American Farmers Pray to Survive 90 Days.

Looking at Canada’s approach, what strikes me first is the philosophical foundation. You probably know this already, but supply management—established through provincial legislation like Ontario’s Farm Products Marketing Act—operates on a straightforward principle. Dairy farmers are legitimate business enterprises deserving predictable returns.

Here’s what’s fascinating about the CDC’s quarterly cost-of-production formula. It includes everything you’d expect in a real business calculation—feed costs (which jumped 8.7% in their latest review period), labor, depreciation on that new mixer wagon you bought, interest paid on operating loans, and even return on equity. When those costs rise, prices adjust through their transparent formula: 50% of index cost changes plus 50% of consumer price trends.

This creates dramatically different planning horizons than what we see south of the border. Research from the University of Guelph suggests that Canadian dairy farmers typically make facility upgrade decisions with a 5-7 year outlook. As many Canadian producers have told me, their milk price adjustments typically stay under 1% annually, based on CDC historical data, so they can actually plan. That guaranteed 2.3% increase? That’s the predictability American farmers can only dream about.

The Hidden Entry Crisis: When Protection Becomes Exclusion

Alberta’s $5.8M Quota Barrier vs America’s $0—But ‘Free Market’ Killed 1,420 US Farms in 2024

But here’s something that doesn’t come up much at Dairy Farmers of Canada meetings—and it’s worth noting. Those quota values are running CA$24,000 per kilogram in Ontario, where it’s price-capped, according to the provincial marketing board. In Alberta? Try CA$58,000 per kilogram on the open exchange, based on Alberta Milk’s August 2025 reports.

So let me do the math for you. A modest 100-cow operation needs CA$2.4-5.8 million just for production rights. That’s before you buy a single cow or pour a single yard of concrete.

The provincial “new entrant” programs supposedly address this. Let me share what they actually offer, based on current program documents I’ve been reviewing:

  • Ontario’s NEQAP: 8 positions available annually for the entire province (and 2 of those are reserved for organic)
  • British Columbia’s GEP: They’re running an accelerated program, clearing a 20-year backlog at 8 entrants per year
  • Quebec: Similar story—limited slots, multi-year waiting lists according to Les Producteurs de lait du Québec

Farmers in BC’s program report waiting periods of 10-15 years, based on media reports and program documentation. Even then—and this is what really gets me—successful applicants often receive a quota for just 25-30 cows. That’s not exactly a path to economic viability when the provincial average is pushing 100 head.

What’s really telling is that the vast majority of Canadian dairy farms transfer within families, according to Statistics Canada’s agricultural census data. It’s becoming something you inherit rather than something you choose. Even the National Farmers Union, which generally supports supply management, admitted in their 2019 policy brief that these programs are “fundamentally inadequate and require major reforms.”

The True Cost to Consumers and Society

You know, Canadian supply management costs consumers approximately CA$444 annually per household through higher retail prices, according to the Conference Board of Canada’s 2023 dairy sector analysis. That’s a direct, transparent wealth transfer totaling about CA$3 billion yearly, based on academic estimates from the University of Saskatchewan and Fraser Institute.

Critics hate it, but at least Canada’s honest about the cost. You’re paying more for milk, and that money goes directly to keeping farmers in business. No hidden subsidies, no complex government programs—just straightforward consumer-to-farmer transfer.

Part II: The American System—Freedom to Fail

Open Access, Constant Crisis

Now, the U.S. system—no quota barriers at all. Got capital? You can start milking tomorrow. But that theoretical openness… well, let me share some numbers from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service that paint a different picture:

  • 2024 farm closures: 1,420 operations lost (that’s a 5% annual decline)
  • Wisconsin alone: 400 dairy farms gone, according to Wisconsin DATCP license data
  • Five-year total: Nearly 10,000 farms have disappeared since 2019
  • Chapter 12 bankruptcies: Up 55% in 2024, based on Federal Reserve agricultural finance data

As Tonya Van Slyke from the Northeast Dairy Producers Association put it in a recent interview: “Dairy farmers are price takers. The Federal Milk Market Order controls what producers get paid for their milk.”

Think about that for a minute. You can have the best somatic cell count in the county, run your repro program perfectly, and manage your transition cows like a textbook operation. But if Class III crashes because there’s too much cheese in cold storage? Well, you’re taking that hit.

I know Wisconsin producers who literally check CME cheese prices on their phones during morning milking, wondering if next month brings another crash. That’s not business planning—that’s survival mode.

The DMC Illusion: Why Safety Nets Have Holes

The Dairy Margin Coverage program—that’s supposed to be America’s safety net, right? Here’s what’s interesting: it hasn’t triggered a payment in 17 months as of October 2025, even though I know plenty of farmers facing severe financial stress.

The formula, as described in FSA’s calculation methodology, considers only corn, soybean meal, and premium alfalfa hay. Labor costs going through the roof? Fuel prices? Is California requiring new environmental compliance equipment? DMC doesn’t see any of that.

What really gets me is what’s happening with succession planning. Agricultural transition consultants report that farm kids who love agriculture, grew up showing at county fairs, have all the skills—they’re going to college and choosing ag lending or veterinary medicine instead of coming home. Why? Because they watched their parents stressed about milk prices for 20 years and thought, “I’m not putting my kids through that.”

The Structural Failure of American Cooperatives: DFA’s Transformation

Here’s where the American system reveals its most fundamental flaw—and this is something we need to talk about more openly. It’s the structural failure of the cooperative model when cooperatives become processors.

The transformation of Dairy Farmers of America illustrates exactly how the system breaks when a cooperative’s business interests as a processor diverge from its members’ interests as farmers.

In May 2020, DFA acquires 44 Dean Foods processing plants for $433 million out of bankruptcy, according to U.S. Bankruptcy Court filings. Overnight, they become both the nation’s largest milk supplier and processor. This created what multiple class-action lawsuits filed in Vermont and other states describe as an “inherent conflict of interest.”

Think about the structural contradiction here. As a cooperative, DFA theoretically exists to maximize returns to farmer-members. But as a processor, DFA profits from buying milk as cheaply as possible. The cooperative’s processing division literally benefits from the same low prices that destroy its members’ operations.

The numbers from the Vermont lawsuit reveal the scope of this structural failure. Before acquiring Dean’s plants, DFA sold over 50% of its members’ milk to third-party processors. By 2021, according to court documents, they were selling 66% of their shares to themselves. When milk prices crashed 30-40% in 2023—and USDA data confirms approximately a 35% decline—DFA’s processing plants captured margin expansion while member farmers absorbed losses.

And here’s what I think is crucial to understand: this isn’t a management failure or the work of bad actors. It’s a fundamental structural flaw. Once a cooperative owns processing assets, its economic incentives become adversarial to its own members. The business model that should protect farmers becomes the mechanism for extracting value from them.

I’ve talked to DFA members who understand this perfectly. They need market access, but their own cooperative has structurally transformed into their competitor. The organization collecting their dues and claiming to represent them profits when they suffer. That’s not a cooperative anymore—it’s a vertically integrated processor with a cooperative facade.

Regional Variations: Scale Doesn’t Save You

You know, this isn’t just a Wisconsin-Pennsylvania story. Down in the Texas Panhandle, where operations are milking 3,000-cow herds, the economics look different, but the fundamental problems persist.

Large-scale operators in that region tell me they’ve got scale, efficiency, and cost per hundredweight that beats almost anyone. But when milk prices drop below $15? Even they bleed. The only difference is that they can bleed longer than the 200-cow farm.

Looking west to California and Idaho, where some operations are milking 10,000-plus cows, these mega-dairies have negotiating power that smaller farms lack. But one Idaho producer managing 8,500 cows told me at the Western States Dairy Expo, “We’ve got economies of scale everyone talks about, but our regulatory compliance budget alone would operate five Wisconsin farms.”

And down in Arizona and New Mexico? The water rights battles are getting brutal. One New Mexico producer with 4,200 cows shared something that stuck with me: “We’re efficient as hell on paper—lowest cost per hundredweight in the nation some months. But what happens when water allocations are cut by 30% and hay prices double because everyone’s irrigation is restricted? Those efficiency numbers don’t mean much.”

Texas A&M agricultural economists have documented what happens when a 5,000-cow dairy goes under—millions in economic impact rippling through rural communities. The big operations might survive longer, but volatility eventually gets everyone.

Hidden Subsidies: The “Free Market” Myth

Here’s something we don’t talk about enough. American dairy receives billions in government support, but we just call it something else. Based on USDA Economic Research Service data:

  • Dairy Margin Coverage payments: $2.7 billion net from 2019 to 2024
  • Federal Milk Marketing Order price supports (harder to calculate, but substantial)
  • Export promotion programs through the Dairy Export Council
  • Regular disaster assistance and emergency payments
  • Subsidized crop insurance that reduces feed costs

We call these “risk management tools” rather than “subsidies.” Lets politicians claim they support “free markets” while channeling taxpayer money to agriculture.

The difference from Canada? Well, Canadian intervention actually achieves its stated goals—stable farm numbers, farmer income security, and functioning rural communities. American intervention? We keep losing farms despite billions in support. Makes you wonder who these programs really benefit.

MetricCanadian Supply ManagementU.S. ‘Free Market’
Farm Exits (Annual)100-150 (1-2%)1,420 (5%)
Entry Cost (100 cows)CA$2.4-5.8M quota + operations$800K-1.2M operations only
Price Volatility<1% annual variation30-40% swings possible
Planning Horizon5-7 years typical90 days common
Consumer CostCA$444/household/year premiumHidden via taxes/programs
New Entrants/Year50-80 nationally (limited slots)Unlimited (but unsupported)
Price Trend 2024-26+2.3% guaranteed increase-11.44% decline (volatile)
Government SupportTransparent consumer transfer$2.7B hidden subsidies (DMC)
Farm StabilityPredictable, stable incomeSurvival mode, constant crisis
Succession Rate88% family transferFarm kids choose other careers
2044 Projection~8,500 farms (stable)<10,000 farms (-60%)

Part III: Finding Common Ground—Lessons from Both Systems

What Actually Works: Three Leverage Points

Stop Begging Cooperatives for Pennies. $10/Gallon Direct Sales = 400-600% Premium in 28 States

Through all this research and talking with farmers across North America, I’m seeing three genuine leverage points for producers seeking stability without Canada’s entry barriers:

1. Direct-to-Consumer Sales Twenty-eight states now allow raw milk sales in some form, according to the Farm-to-Consumer Legal Defense Fund’s 2025 tracking. Producers engaging in direct sales report getting $8-12 per gallon—that’s a 400-600% premium over conventional farmgate prices. As many Pennsylvania producers have told me, moving 20% of production to direct sales changes the entire negotiation dynamic with cooperatives.

2. State-Level Political Organization Vermont Senator Peter Welch chairs the Senate Agriculture subcommittee specifically because dairy farmers in his state vote as a coordinated bloc. With only 300-400 dairy farms, Vermont shows what’s possible when farmers organize strategically. If Pennsylvania’s 6,130 dairy farms voted together on dairy issues, they’d own rural policy in that state.

3. Forward Contracting and Risk Management University of Wisconsin-Extension research on risk management consistently shows farms using comprehensive tools—forward contracts, futures hedging, options strategies—achieve significantly more stable margins. Yet adoption remains minimal because, honestly, when you’re checking milk prices daily just hoping to survive the month, learning about put options feels pretty theoretical.

Vermont’s Failed Organizing Attempt: The Missing Legal Framework

Back in the early 2000s, Vermont dairy farmers tried something interesting, as documented in agricultural organizing literature. The Dairy Farmers Working Together movement organized roughly 300 producers, representing about a third of Vermont’s milk production, according to Vermont Extension’s historical accounts. They thought that if they had enough milk, the co-ops would have to negotiate.

But here’s what happened—they just got ignored. No legal framework forced processors to negotiate. The movement collapsed within two years. It showed that a voluntary organization without legal teeth doesn’t work against concentrated processor power.

Learning from New Zealand: A Third Way?

Looking at international models, something is interesting happening in New Zealand. Fonterra—their massive cooperative that handles about 80% of NZ milk according to their 2024 annual report—provides forecast milk prices 18 months out without any quota system.

Their August 2025 forecast came in at NZ$10.15 per kilogram of milk solids (roughly US$21 per hundredweight), with a range of $10.10-10.20. That’s a 1% variance window. No quota to buy, no barriers to entry, just coordinated supply forecasting and transparent pricing.

The Kiwi approach demonstrates you don’t need government protection if you have collective discipline and transparent communication.

Quick Comparison: System Outcomes

MetricCanadian Supply ManagementU.S. “Free Market”
Farm Exits (Annual)~100-150 (1-2%)1,420 (5%)
Entry Cost (100 cows)CA$2.4-5.8M quota + operations$800K-1.2M operations only
Price Volatility<1% annual variation30-40% swings possible
Planning Horizon5-7 years typical90 days common
Consumer CostCA$444/household/year premiumHidden via taxes/programs
New Entrants/Year50-80 nationallyUnlimited (but unsupported)

The Projected Timeline: Where This All Leads

By 2044, America Will Have Fewer Dairies Than Canada—Despite 10x the Population

If current trends continue—and there’s no reason to think they won’t—here’s what we’re looking at:

U.S. Dairy Farm Projections (5% annual attrition from USDA data):

  • 2025: 24,811 farms (current)
  • 2030: ~18,000 farms
  • 2035: ~13,000 farms
  • 2040: ~10,500 farms
  • 2044: <10,000 farms

Canadian Projections:

  • Maintaining 8,000-9,000 farms through 2040
  • But increasing concentration as new entrants can’t access
  • Average herd size is climbing steadily
  • Small operations selling quota to larger neighbors

Both trajectories lead to the same place—just at different speeds and with different pain levels along the way.

Key Takeaways for Dairy Farmers

Based on everything I’ve learned researching this piece, here’s what I think farmers need to consider:

For Canadian Farmers:

  • Defend supply management hard—that 2.3% guaranteed increase is stability American farmers would kill for
  • Push for real new entrant reforms—8 positions annually won’t sustain your industry long-term
  • Consider quota leasing models instead of ownership—maintains stability without the CA$2.4 million entry barrier
  • Watch the generational transfer issue—if young farmers can’t enter, the system eventually collapses from within
  • Prepare for continued trade pressure—international partners aren’t giving up on challenging the system

For American Farmers:

  • Stop waiting for markets to fix themselves—1,420 farms closing annually proves they won’t
  • Organize politically at the state levels—300-400 farms can swing rural elections if you vote together
  • Explore direct sales aggressively—it’s your only real leverage against processor dominance
  • Demand actual DMC reform—the current formula, ignoring labor, fuel, and equipment costs, is insulting
  • Consider regional cooperative alternatives to vertically integrated giants—smaller can mean more accountable
  • Study Quebec’s political discipline—they didn’t ask nicely, they demanded protection and got it

For Both:

  • Accept that all dairy is subsidized—fight about subsidy effectiveness, not existence
  • Address succession planning now—both systems struggle with generational transfer
  • Build political coalitions beyond ag—rural community survival depends on viable farms
  • Learn from international models—New Zealand, EU systems offer valuable lessons

The Bottom Line: Learning from Both Models

What I’ve come to realize is that neither system offers a perfect solution. Canada protects existing farmers brilliantly, but basically locks out newcomers through those quota costs. America keeps the door open but provides zero meaningful protection against volatility that’s destroying multi-generational operations.

There’s potentially a “third way” that combines the best of both—cost-of-production pricing principles from Canada with leased production rights instead of owned quota, maintaining American accessibility while providing stability through collective bargaining frameworks. Something that would include transparent cost-of-production pricing that captures all real expenses (not just three feed ingredients), leased production rights to avoid multi-million-dollar barriers, democratic farmer governance through marketing boards with actual legal authority, market upside participation so farmers benefit from rallies, and real new-entrant programs offering viable scale, not token positions.

Looking at that October 30 CDC announcement giving Canadian farmers a guaranteed increase while American producers face continued uncertainty—it’s not just about prices. It’s showing us that dairy policy is a choice. Both countries are making choices, and increasingly, farmers in both systems are questioning whether those choices actually serve their interests.

That Wisconsin farmer’s observation keeps echoing in my mind: “We keep being told markets will sort it out. But after losing 400 farms in our state last year, I’m starting to wonder if the market’s solution is just to sort us out of business.”

The systems are different, the challenges are real, but the goal should be the same: dairy farms that can survive, thrive, and transfer to the next generation. Right now, neither country has fully figured that out. But understanding what works and what doesn’t in both systems? That’s the first step toward finding something better.

And maybe—just maybe—if we stop defending our respective systems long enough to learn from each other, we might find that third way that actually keeps farmers farming for generations to come.

Learn More:

  • Dairy Farm Succession Planning – Critical Conversations for a Smooth Transition – This article provides a tactical roadmap for navigating the complex family and financial conversations essential for a successful farm transition, helping ensure the operation’s legacy and long-term viability—a critical issue raised in the main analysis.
  • Navigating the Waters: Key Global Dairy Market Trends for 2025 – This analysis delivers strategic insights into the global economic and consumer trends shaping North American milk prices. It provides essential context for understanding market volatility and making informed, long-range business decisions beyond domestic policy debates.
  • The ROI of Robotics: A Producer’s Guide to Dairy Automation – This guide offers a data-driven framework for evaluating the return on investment of dairy automation. It demonstrates how robotics can directly combat rising labor costs and improve operational efficiency, offering a practical solution to the economic pressures detailed above.
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